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Games with incomplete information are formulated in a multi-sector probability matrix for-
malism that can cope with quantum as well as classical strategies. An analysis of classical and
quantum strategy in a multi-sector extension of the game of Battle of Sexes clarifies the two
distinct roles of nonlocal strategies, and establish the direct link between the true quantum
gain of game’s payoff and the breaking of Bell inequalities.
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1. Introduction
Although Bell’s inequalities1, 2) are usually discussed in
the context of quantum Bell experiments with spins and
observers, they can be established in a far wider variety
of settings. Here we bring one such example in a rather
unexpected field of the theory of games of incomplete in-
formation.3) Game theory now occupies a central place in
areas of applied mathematics, economics, sociology, and
in mathematical biology. It is well known that Bell in-
equality can be broken only when the assumption of local
realism is abandoned. This result, when considered in the
context of game theory of incomplete information, links
together the breaking of Bell inequality and the exis-
tence of nonlocal correlation between players. To explore
this further, a consideration of quantum strategies4–8) in
games of incomplete information becomes both relevant
and interesting.
With rapid advancement of quantum information tech-
nologies, playing games with quantum resources is within
the technical reach of advanced laboratories.9, 10) It is
quite conceivable that playing games with quantum
strategies, using properly coordinated quantum devices,
becomes commonplace in the near future. It is therefore
timely that we analyze the physical contents of quantum
strategies, and examine the relevance of Bell inequality
breaking. It is now generally agreed that quantum strat-
egy can shift the classical outcome of the game in favor
of all players, but how much of it is due to truly quan-
tum effect, never achievable classically, is still under de-
bate.11) Games with incomplete information synergetic
to Bell experiment setup appears to be a good candidate
to settle this issue, which is one of the basic unanswered
question of quantum game theory.
To study quantum strategies in games of incomplete
information, we develop a formalism of game theory
based on multi-sector probability matrix. We then
analyze a game of incomplete information which is an
extension of the well known game of Battle of Sexes
and find the classical and the quantum Bayesian Nash
equilibria. We find two distinct effects of quantum
entanglement in games of incomplete information:
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pseudo-classical distortion and quantum nonlocality.
These two effects, in fact, has been already identified
as two separate correction terms in the payoff functions
in a previous study of games with complete infor-
mation.7) It has been found there, however, that the
pseudo-classical term, which can be simulated classi-
cally, tends to overshadow the subtle effect of quantum
nonlocality term. It is shown, in this work, that the
purely quantum element of quantum game strategy can
be unambiguously separated in a proper setup utiliz-
ing Bell inequality, and that setup is exactly found in
Harsanyi’s theory of games with incomplete information.
2. Joint Probability Formalism of Incomplete
Information Game
We start by formulating game strategies in terms of
joint probabilities which do not, in general, factorize into
individual player strategies.12) Consider a system con-
sisting of two players, Alice and Bob, who are to play
two-strategy games, that is, to make selection from re-
spective dichotomic choices, which we label as A = 0 or
1 for Alice, and B = 0 or 1 for Bob. The players are
assumed to be autonomous decision makers interested
in increasing their respective utility functions, or pay-
offs ΠAlice and ΠBob. Game theory tries to answer the
question what the stable pattern of selections are after
sufficient repetitions of game plays. In the game theory,
both payoffs ΠAlice and ΠBob are functions of A and B at
the same time. In general, there is no unilateral optimal
choice for neither players.
In determining the form of payoffs, we assume that
not all information necessary to specify payoff functions
are known to players. Following Harsanyi,3) we represent
this unknown elements of the game by the concept of
player type; Both players comes into the play in one of
two types denoted by a = 0, 1 for Alice, and b = 0, 1
for Bob, and payoffs are uniquely determined only after
determination of types. Specifically, when Alice in type
a mode makes her move A and Bob in b makes his move
B, we assign real numbers M
[ab]
AB for Alice’s payoff, and
L
[ab]
AB for Bob’s. With varying indices a, b, A and B, both
M
[ab]
AB and M
[ab]
AB form payoff matrices.
1
2 KUT Preprint Bayesian Nash equilibria and Bell inequalities T.Cheon and A.Iqbal
After sufficient run of repeated game play, the pattern
of the play is specified by the joint probability P
[ab]
AB which
represents the fraction of plays in which the move of Alice
of type a is A, and that of Bob of type b, B. The average
payoffs for Alice and Bob of respective types a and b are
given by
Π
[ab]
Alice =
∑
A,B
M
[ab]
ABP
[ab]
AB , Π
[ab]
Bob =
∑
A,B
L
[ab]
ABP
[ab]
AB . (1)
As probabilities, P
[ab]
AB satisfy the relations
∑
A,B P
[ab]
AB =
1 for any given types of players a and b. If we further
assume that the types of the players at each turn of play
is determined randomly (by Nature’s move) with proba-
bilities S[a] and T [b], we obtain the total average payoffs
in the forms
ΠAlice=
∑
a,b
S[a]T [b]Π
[ab]
Alice, ΠBob=
∑
a,b
S[a]T [b]Π
[ab]
Bob. (2)
Central to the theory of game with incomplete informa-
tion is the assumption of local knowledge of player types,
which postulates that the type of a player at each turn
of the play is known only to herself (himself) and not
to the other player. The statistical distributions of types
S[a], T [b] are treated as common knowledge. It then fol-
lows that the pattern of play, or the strategy of Alice,
which we assign symbol α, has to be determined only by
the knowledge of a, but not with b. Likewise strategy of
Bob β can depend on his type b but not on Alice’s a.
Since the strategies of Alice and Bob jointly determine
the joint probability of play, we can express the assump-
tion of locality of player type as
P
[ab]
AB = P
[ab]
AB (α
[a], β[b]). (3)
In traditional game theory, which has exclusively con-
sidered strategy based on classical resources, the joint
probability is given by the product of individual proba-
bilities as
P
[ab]
AB = P
[a]
A Q
[b]
B , (4)
where P
[a]
A represents the probability of Alice of type a
selecting the move A, and Q
[b]
B the probability of Bob of
type b selecting the move B. In this case, we can identify
the P
[a]
A itself as Alice’s strategy α
[a] and Q
[b]
B itself as
Bob’s strategy β[b], and no distinction between strategy
and individual probability is necessary. To generate de-
sired strategies, players need access to devices that can
generate probability distribution, such as dices.
If, on the other hand, we are to consider strategy based
on quantum resources, we can construct joint probabil-
ity out of individual strategies that correspond to the
individual actions on Hilbert space vector. For definite-
ness, we adopt the quantum strategy based on Schmidt
decomposition,13) that is known to cover entire 2 × 2
dimensional Hilbert space, which is given by
P
[ab]
AB (α
[a], β[b]) =
∣∣〈AB|Uα[a]Vβ[b] |Φγφ〉∣∣2 , (5)
where the “initial” state |Φγφ〉 residing on 2 × 2 dimen-
sional Hilbert space is given by
|Φγφ〉 = cos γ
2
|00〉+ eiφ sin γ
2
|11〉 , (6)
and individual rotations Uα and Vβ in 2 dimensional sub-
spaces, which are now identified as individual strategies,
are given by
Uα |0〉 = cos α
2
|0〉+ sin α
2
|1〉 ,
Uα |1〉 = − sin α
2
|0〉+ cos α
2
|1〉 ,
Vβ |0〉 = cos β
2
|0〉+ sin β
2
|1〉 , (7)
Vβ |1〉 = − sin β
2
|0〉+ cos β
2
|1〉 .
Note that, in addition to individual strategy variables
α and β, which are defined within the range [0, pi], that
are respectively controlled by Alice and Bob, there ap-
pear two more variables γ ∈ [0, pi] and φ [0, pi] “from
nowhere”, as a result of the requirement that strategies
be described by Hilbert space vectors. A natural inter-
pretation of these new variables is that they belong to
a third person, the coordinator of the game.7) There are
alternative choices of quantum strategies7, 14) than the
one given by (5)-(7), but they do not change our main
conclusion, as long as entire Hilbert space is exhausted,
and thus all possible quantum joint probabilities are in-
cluded. The quantum joint probability (5) can be real-
ized, for example, by the coordinator first generating two
z-axis-polarized spins in entangled state (6), then Alice
and Bob obtaining one spin each, and performing spin ro-
tations and their subsequent measurement along z-axis,
or equivalently, just measuring spins along properly ro-
tated axes.
If the initial state is prepared disentangled, for exam-
ple in γ = 0 state, the quantum strategy (5) is simply
reduced to classical strategy (4) with identification
P
[a]
A = | 〈A|Uα[a] |0〉 |2, Q[b]B = | 〈B|Vβ[b] |0〉 |2, (8)
which means that we have replaced usual dice by quan-
tum spin systems that act exactly as classical dices, albeit
with far greater cost.
The payoffs are now the functions of strategy variables
α and β, and also of coordinator variables γ and φ;
ΠAlice = ΠAlice(α, β; γ, φ),
ΠBob = ΠBob(α, β; γ, φ). (9)
Here, we have adopted the obvious shorthand notations
α = (α[1], α[2]) and β = (β[1], β[2]). Once payoff functions
are calculated as functions of strategies, the solution of
the game is given by constructing Bayesian Nash equi-
libria (α⋆, β⋆) which are obtained from local maximum
specified by
∂
∂α[a]
ΠAlice(α, β; γ, φ)
∣∣∣∣
(α⋆,β⋆)
= 0,
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∂
∂β[b]
ΠBob(α, β; γ, φ)
∣∣∣∣
(α⋆,β⋆)
= 0. (10)
If the payoffs do not have maxima as functions of α and
β, classical pure Nash equilibria emerge as the “edge”
solutions;
α[a]⋆ = 0, β[b]⋆ = 0 if
∂
∂α[a]
ΠAlice(α, β; γ, φ)< 0,
∂
∂β[b]
ΠBob(α, β; γ, φ)< 0, (11)
α[a]⋆ = pi, β[b]⋆ = 0 if
∂
∂α[a]
ΠAlice(α, β; γ, φ)> 0,
∂
∂β[b]
ΠBob(α, β; γ, φ)< 0, (12)
α[a]⋆ = 0, β[b]⋆ = pi if
∂
∂α[a]
ΠAlice(α, β; γ, φ)< 0,
∂
∂β[b]
ΠBob(α, β; γ, φ)> 0, (13)
α[a]⋆ = pi, β[b]⋆ = pi if
∂
∂α[a]
ΠAlice(α, β; γ, φ)> 0,
∂
∂β[b]
ΠBob(α, β; γ, φ)> 0. (14)
In all cases, the Bayesian Nash payoffs are obtained as
Π⋆Alice(γ, φ) = ΠAlice(α
⋆, β⋆; γ, φ),
Π⋆Bob(γ, φ) = ΠBob(α
⋆, β⋆; γ, φ), (15)
for all combinations of [ab] = [00], [10], [01] and [11].
Note that Bayesian Nash equilibria are defined for each
fixed values for coordinator variables.
3. Extended Battle of Sexes Game
In this section, we analyze a particular example of
game with incomplete information, that shows the power
of quantum strategies in dramatical fashion. We now con-
sider the following payoff matrices
M =


+3 0
0 +1
−3 0
0 −1
−3 0
0 −1
−1 0
0 −3

 ,
L =


+1 0
0 +3
−1 0
0 −3
−1 0
0 −3
−3 0
0 −1

 . (16)
Here, 2 × 2 blocks represent payoff matrices for fixed
player types, [ab] = [00], [01], [10] and [11] from top-left
to bottom right, namely
M =
(
M [00] M [01]
M [10] M [11]
)
, L =
(
L[00] L[01]
L[10] L[11]
)
. (17)
We assume the “democratic” mixture of two types, S[0] =
S[1] = 1/2 and T [0] = T [1] = 1/2. The payoffs are given,
in terms of joint probabilities P
[ab]
AB as
ΠAlice =
3
4
(P
[00]
00 − P [10]00 − P [01]00 − P [11]11 )
+
1
4
(P
[00]
11 − P [10]11 − P [01]11 − P [11]00 ),
ΠBob =
1
4
(P
[00]
00 − P [10]00 − P [01]00 − P [11]11 ) (18)
+
3
4
(P
[00]
11 − P [10]11 − P [01]11 − P [11]00 ).
It is easily seen that the two terms of ΠAlice and those
of ΠBob are identical apart from the different weights.
They are both made up of P
[ab]
AB of four different type
combinations [ab]. This is so by design, which soon be-
comes evident in the followings. The factors 3/4 and 1/4
are, of course, the result of our specific choice of numbers
±3 and ±1 in the entries of payoff matrices M and L,
and any other positive numbers will leave our analysis
essentially unchanged.
The game in “main sector” that is played by type
a = 0 Alice and type b = 0 Bob is nothing but usual
Battle of Sexes game. If both players are limited within
this sector, there are two obvious pure Nash equilibria,
(A⋆, B⋆) = (0, 0) and (A⋆, B⋆) = (1, 1), or equivalently,
(α[0]
⋆
, β[0]
⋆
) = (0, 0) and (α[0]
⋆
, β[0]
⋆
) = (pi, pi). The for-
mer solution is advantageous to Alice and the latter to
Bob as being evident from the payoffs (Π
[00]⋆
Alice,Π
[00]⋆
Bob ) =
(3, 1) for the former and (Π
[00]⋆
Alice,Π
[00]⋆
Bob ) = (1, 3) for the
latter. In the “shadow sectors” [ab] = [10], [01] and [11],
the game table is that of Chicken Game. If both play-
ers are limited within each sectors, Nash equilibria are
achieved by (A⋆, B⋆) = (1, 0) and (A⋆, B⋆) = (0, 1), both
of which results in zero payoffs (Π
[ab]⋆
Alice,Π
[ab]⋆
Bob ) = (0, 0).
For the full game with incomplete information, the lack
of knowledge leaves the players guessing on the type of
other party, and they have to be content with settling
with less payoffs on average, in comparison with the case
of full information above. For the calculation of full game,
we define
∆00 ≡ P [00]00 − P [10]00 − P [01]00 − P [11]11 ,
∆11 ≡ P [00]11 − P [10]11 − P [01]11 − P [11]00 . (19)
Obviously, we have Bayesian Nash equilibria when we
have simultaneous maxima for ∆00 and ∆11 as functions
of α and β. Explicit form for ∆00 is
∆00 = cos
2 γ
2
(
cos2
α[0]
2
cos2
β[0]
2
− cos2 α
[1]
2
cos2
β[0]
2
− cos2 α
[0]
2
cos2
β[1]
2
− sin2 α
[1]
2
sin2
β[1]
2
)
+sin2
γ
2
(
sin2
α[0]
2
sin2
β[0]
2
− sin2 α
[1]
2
sin2
β[0]
2
− sin2 α
[0]
2
sin2
β[1]
2
− cos2 α
[1]
2
cos2
β[1]
2
)
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+
1
4
cosφ sin γ
(
sinα[0] sinβ[0] − sinα[1] sinβ[0] (20)
− sinα[0] sinβ[1] − sinα[1] sinβ[1]
)
.
The other quantity ∆11 is obtained by the simultaneous
replacements α→ pi−α and β → pi− β, or equivalently,
by the replacement γ → pi − γ. From these, we obtain
the condition for Bayesian Nash equilibrium as
sinα[0](cos β[0] − cosβ[1])
− cosα[0](sinβ[0] − sinβ[1]) cosφ sin γ = 0,
sinα[1](cos β[0] + cosβ[1])
− cosα[1](sinβ[0] + sinβ[1]) cosφ sin γ = 0,
sinβ[0](cosα[0] − cosα[1])
− cosβ[0](sinα[0] − sinα[1]) cosφ sin γ = 0, (21)
sinβ[1](cosα[0] + cosα[1])
− cosβ[1](sinα[0] + sinα[1]) cosφ sin γ = 0.
The classical game is obtained as the limit of no en-
tanglement, γ = 0, for which we recover the separability
of probabilities, P
[ab]
AB = P
[a]
A Q
[b]
B . There are eight sets of
Bayesian Nash equilibria found in this game, all support-
ing the break-even payoffs
Π⋆Alice = 0, Π
⋆
Bob = 0. (22)
They are
1 : α[0] = 0, α[1] = 0, β[0] = arbitrary, β[1] = pi,
2 : α[0] = pi, α[1] = pi, β[0] = arbitrary, β[1] = 0,
3 : α[0] = 0, α[1] = pi, β[0] = 0, β[1] = arbitrary,
4 : α[0] = pi, α[1] = 0, β[0] = pi, β[1] = arbitrary, (23)
5 : α[0] = arbitrary, α[1] = pi, β[0] = 0, β[1] = 0,
6 : α[0] = arbitrary, α[1] = 0, β[0] = pi, β[1] = pi,
7 : α[0] = 0, α[1] = arbitrary, β[0] = 0, β[1] = pi,
8 : α[0] = pi, α[1] = arbitrary, β[0] = pi, β[1] = 0.
There is a deeper reason for the fact that the Bayesian
Nash equilibria for this game only gives zero payoffs and
nothing more: That is exactly the Bell inequalities. In our
setting of 2 × 2 game, Bell inequalities are the relations
among joint probabilities for Alice and Bob each being
capable of turning up in two types a = 0, 1 and b = 0,
1. If each player choose her/his probability only with the
knowledge of her/his own type, but not of other player,
a set of inequalities can be proven. Since this condition is
exactly the type-locality assumption we have postulated
in the game of incomplete information, it is reasonable
that we expect Bell inequalities to be satisfied in our
settings. A specifically relevant ones in our case are the
inequalities first proven by Cereceda15) which read
P
[00]
00 − P [10]00 − P [01]00 − P [11]11 ≤ 0,
P
[00]
11 − P [10]11 − P [01]11 − P [11]00 ≤ 0. (24)
There are 64 Cereceda inequalities obtainable by renam-
ing of superscripts [ab] and subscripts AB, that can be
divided into 16 quartets. Each quartet sums up to give
a single CHSH inequality, and can be regarded as a set
of “elementary” pieces of a CHSH inequality. Each Cere-
ceda inequality contains all four combinations of types
[ab]. It is shown by Fine16) that the Bell inequality break-
ing occurs if and only if the assumption of factorizability
of joint probabilities, (4), is violated. Since LHSs of the
Cereceda inequality, (24) are nothing other than ∆00 and
∆11, we always have
ΠAlice ≤ 0, ΠBob ≤ 0. (25)
We can now see that, with the Bayesian Nash payoffs
(22), both players are getting maximum payoffs mathe-
matically possible under the assumption of type-locality.
If players are allowed to share quantum objects, it is
possible to have nonlocal strategies, and it is expected
that the classical limit of payoffs imposed by Cereceda
inequality can be exceeded.
There are, however, limits on the amount of quantum
breaking of Bell inequalities. According to Cirel’son,17)
the nonlocality supplied by quantum mechanics can
break the Cereceda-Bell inequality up to the following
amount;
P
[00]
00 − P [10]00 − P [01]00 − P [11]11 ≤
√
2− 1
2
,
P
[00]
11 − P [10]11 − P [01]11 − P [11]00 ≤
√
2− 1
2
. (26)
which should limits the possible payoffs to
ΠAlice ≤
√
2− 1
2
, ΠBob ≤
√
2− 1
2
, (27)
even with the quantum strategies.
As is well known, Bell inequalities are, in general, max-
imally broken when the quantum entanglement is largest.
For the quantum strategy given by (5) and (6), that cor-
responds to the case of γ = pi/2 and φ = 0. In this case,
Bayesian Nash condition (21) becomes
sin(α[0] − β[1])− sin(α[0] − β[0]) = 0,
sin(α[1] − β[1]) + sin(α[1] − β[0]) = 0,
sin(α[1] − β[0])− sin(α[0] − β[0]) = 0, (28)
sin(α[1] − β[1]) + sin(α[0] − β[1]) = 0.
From this condition, we can identify a single set of quan-
tum Bayesian Nash equilibria for the case of cosφ sin γ =
1 as
β[0]⋆ − α[0]⋆ = pi
4
,
β[1]⋆ − α[0]⋆ = 3pi
4
, (29)
α[1]⋆ − β[0]⋆ = 5pi
4
.
Since there are only three constraints on four quantities,
Bayesian Nash we have is a continuous set. For this set
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of values, we have
∆00 = ∆11 = cos
2 pi
8
− 3 sin2 pi
8
, (30)
which immediately leads to the quantum Bayesian Nash
payoffs
Π⋆Alice =
√
2− 1
2
, Π⋆Bob =
√
2− 1
2
. (31)
In this quantum case again, both players are getting
maximal payoffs allowable under the Cirel’son limit
(26). Note again that positive payoffs are never possible
under classical strategies even with correlations, for
example, cheap-talk and altruism, and it is a signature of
nonclassical correlation inherent in quantum strategies.
4. Pseudo-classical and Quantum Interference
Components
In order to examine the physical contents of the quan-
tum strategies in detail, we define the single player prob-
abilities
p
[a]
A = |〈A|Uα[a] |0〉|2 , q[b]B =
∣∣〈B|Uβ[b] |0〉∣∣2 , (32)
with which, we express the joint probability
P
[ab]
AB = cos
2 γ
2
p
[a]
A q
[b]
B + sin
2 γ
2
p
[a]
A¯
q
[b]
B¯
+(−)A+B cosφ sin γ
√
p
[a]
A p
[a]
A¯
q
[b]
B q
[b]
B¯
. (33)
Here, the notation 0¯ = 1, 1¯ = 0 is used. The sector
payoffs Πab take the form
Π
[ab]
Alice =
∑
A,B
( cos2
γ
2
M
[ab]
AB + sin
2 γ
2
L
[ab]
AB ) p
[a]
A q
[b]
B
+cosφ sin γ
√
p
[a]
0 p
[a]
1 q
[b]
0 q
[b]
1
∑
A,B
(−)A+BM [ab]AB ,
Π
[ab]
Bob =
∑
A,B
( cos2
γ
2
L
[ab]
AB + sin
2 γ
2
M
[ab]
AB ) p
[a]
A q
[b]
B
+cosφ sin γ
√
p
[a]
0 p
[a]
1 q
[b]
0 q
[b]
1
∑
A,B
(−)A+BL[ab]AB, (34)
where we have used the symmetry property L
[ab]
AB =M
[ab]
A¯B¯
of our game. In this form, we clearly see that both payoffs
are composed of two components. First component, for-
merly termed as classical family7) represents essentially
classical payoff coming from “altruistic” modification of
the game matrix.18, 19) Even with this modification, the
payoffs are still constructed from factorizable probabili-
ties p
[a]
A q
[b]
B , and therefore, payoffs will never exceed the
limit (25). This leaves the second component, previously
known as interference term, as the sole source of truly
quantum gain in the payoff that is achieved through the
Bell inequality breakings.
In hindsight, it should have been naturally expected
that the probabilities generated from “successful” quan-
tum strategies shall break some form of Bell inequalities,
since extra quantum gains obtained from such strategies
should be, by definition, the result of breakdown of the
assumption of factorizability, (4). However, in order
to establish a direct link between the Bell inequality
breaking and the extra quantum gain in game’s payoff,
it is necessary to have a proper game theoretic setup,
and that is exactly what we have shown here with the
game of incomplete information. It is rather miraculous
that essentially identical setup has been conceived con-
temporaneously in two separate disciplines as Harsanyi’s
game theory and Bell’s quantum measurement theory.
It seems possible that future investigation may reveal a
hidden intellectual thread between the two. It could also
be that they originate from a common mid-twentieth
century Zeitgeist.
5. Extensions to Many Player Games
The following inequality is shown to hold by Cere-
ceda20) for 2× 2× 2 system, that is a system with three
spins measured by three observers, Alice, Bob and Chris,
each equipped with detector capable of performing spin
projection measurement along two possible directions.
P
[000]
000 − P [100]000 − P [010]000 − P [001]000 − P [111]111 ≤ 0,
P
[000]
111 − P [100]111 − P [010]111 − P [001]111 − P [111]000 ≤ 0. (35)
It is easy to conceive a 2×2×2 game that shows quantum
gain using this inequality. Following type of game matrix
will do;
{M [0bc]0BC} =


+3 0
0 0
−3 0
0 0
−3 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

 ,
{L[0bc]0BC} =


+1 0
0 0
−1 0
0 0
−1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

 ,
{M [0bc]1BC} =


0 0
0 +1
0 0
0 −1
0 0
0 −1
0 0
0 0

 ,
{L[0bc]1BC} =


0 0
0 +3
0 0
0 −3
0 0
0 −3
0 0
0 0

 ,
{M [1bc]0BC} =


−3 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
−1 0
0 0

 ,
{L[1bc]0BC} =


−1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
−3 0
0 0

 , (36)
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{M [1bc]1BC} =


0 0
0 −1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 −3

 ,
{L[1bc]1BC} =


0 0
0 −3
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 −1

 .
Further geralization of this result to 2×2× ...×2 system
is
P
[00...0]
00...0 − P [100...0]00...0 − P [010...0]00...0 − ...
−P [00...01]00...0 − P [11...1]11..1 ≤ 0,
P
[00...0]
11...1 − P [100...0]11...1 − P [010...0]11...1 − ...
−P [00...01]11...1 − P [11...1]00...0 ≤ 0. (37)
It should again be easy to formulate a multi-party game
based on this general Cereceda inequality.
Although current set of examples of fully solvable
quantum game of incomplete information is of rather spe-
cial sort, having very sparse nonzero elements, it shows
the two different novel aspects of quantum strategy that
are not present in classical counterpart in very clear
fashion. The relation between purely quantum gain in
the payoff and Bell inequality breaking is indeed strik-
ing. It is obvious that the same effects should persist
in more general quantum games albeit with less clearly
discernible form.
In summary, we have shown that there is a genuine
advantage in quantum strategy that is not accessible by
classical resources, and that advantage is to be found
most clearly and unambiguously in a refined settings of
Harsanyi’s games of incomplete information.
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